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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Does a mistake on an unsigned reminder notice effect a 
decrease in the rental rate for storage units? 
II. Were the remedies taken by and afforded to the Plaintiff 
for Defendant's failure to pay the full amount of rent in 
accordance with law? 
III. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the post-
judgment actions of the Trial Court, and if so, were such 
actions in accordance with law? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THE APPELLANT'S REPLY 
BRIEF AS FOLLOWS: 
Utah Judicial Code section 38-8-3 
Utah Judicial Code Section 38-8-2 
Utah Judicial Code Section 78-36-2(1) 
Constitution of Utah Art. I, Sec. 11 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
A purported mistake on an unsigned reminder notice does effect 
a decrease in the rental rate for storage units, the remedies taken 
by and afforded to the Plaintiff for the alleged Defendant's failure 
to pay the full amount of rent were not in accordance with law, and 
finally, this Court does have jurisdiction to review the postjudgment 
actions of the Trial Court, and the actions followed were not in 
accordance with law. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE I 
A PURPORTED MISTAKE ON AN UNSIGNED REMINDER NOTICE DOES EFFECT 
A DECREASE IN THE RENTAL RATE FOR STORAGE UNITS WHEN RELIED UPON BY 
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THE APPELLANT IN SUBMITTING AS REQUESTEDf BY THE RESPONDENT'S DULY 
AUTHORIZED AGENT WITH APPARENT AUTHORITY, THE TIMELY FULL PAYMENTS 
OP RENT EITHER IN CASH (APP-4 AND 7) OR THE APPROPRIATE MONTHLY 
AMORTIZATIONS OP THE APPELLANT'S APPROPRIATE COUNTERCLAIM LIEN FOR 
TROVER AND CONVERSION OF HIS BUSINESS PROPERTY (APP-16, 19, 20, 21, 
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, AND 27) WHICH WAS RECOGNIZED, RECEIVED AND 
ACCEPTED; BY THE RESPONDENT'S DULY AUTHORIZED AGENT WITH APPARENT 
AUTHORITY, RENDERING FULL AND TIMELY PAYMENT ENJOYMENT, AS REQUESTED. 
To fully understand the Respondent's defense of a purported 
"MISTAKE" an issue of material fact, and the asserted premise from 
which they stand in requesting this Court to affirm a Summary 
Judgment and to enforce the Respondent's entitlement for reformation 
of the contract, to a previous rent-rate in violation of the 
contractual notification requirements/ and to enforce reformation of 
the Respondent's omitted language in the written signed contract as 
to the notification requirements/ a required threshold, prior to 
becoming effective, for rent-rate decreases one must import fault 
upon: 
Either the Appellant, who was required to sign the Rental 
Agreement dated June 12, 1987, (App-42) as a condition of 
renting the Respondent's storage units Nos. 143 and 144, 
or the Respondent who properly noticed the Appellant for 
the appropriate rent-rate decreases to be effective May 1, 
1988 (App-4) and to be effective retroactive for the month 
of October 1988 and to commence on a going forward basis 
from November 1, 1988 (App-17), 
for the responsibility of the purported alleged mistake and the 
Respondent's ignorance of their contractual duties of responsibility, 
set forth in their own required-to-be-signed Rental Agreement. Some 
noted authorities have stated: 
"Reformation will not be decreed unless the facts required 
for such a decree are proved convincingly and to the entire 
satisfaction of the Court. A mere preponderance of the 
evidence is said not to be enough." 
Professor Corbin on Contracts, Chapter 29 1 615, page 743. 
"The authorities all require that parol evidence of a 
mistake in a written contract must be most clear and 
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convincing. The language of some of the cases is 'the 
strongest possible1. Courts of equity do not grant the 
remedy of reformation upon a probability, nor even upon a 
mere preponderance of evidence, but only upon a certainty 
of error.H 
Dougherty v. Lion Fire Ins. Co,, 84 N.Y.S. 10 (New York 1903). 
HThe mistake of which a party to a written contract may be 
heard to complain in equity can arise in only one of three 
ways: 
First, it may be a mistake of law, 
Second, it may be a mistake entertained by the Plaintiff 
with the knowledge of the Defendant arising under 
circumstances which impose the duty upon the Defendant to 
correct the Plaintiff's error. Defendant's failure to do 
so is itself a species of fraud and is treated as fraud, 
Third, species of mistake is . . . when through fraud, 
mistake, or accident a written contract fails to express 
the real intention of the parties, such intention is to be 
regarded, and the erroneous parts of the writing 
disregarded." 
Moreno Mut. IRR. Co. v. Beaumont IRR. Dist., 211 P.2d 937, 938 (Cal. 
1949). 
Applying these rules to the case at bar, no mistake of law is 
claimed. The second, the Respondent's claim in the Attorney's 
prepared and canned Affidavit of Ms. Audrey Hooper dated April 29, 
1989, par. Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 (App-5 and 5A) that a mistake was made 
proclaiming knowledge to the Appellant, wherein the Appellant would 
be required, or through a court-ordered imposition of a duty upon the 
Appellant to correct the Respondent's error. The Respondent's 
affiant Ms. Audrey Hooper Deposition taken dated April 29, 1989, 
clearly controverts and declares under oath just the opposite to her 
Attorney's prepared and canned Affidavit of the same day, at the same 
time, by the same person. (App-6 and 6A) which states that: 
Lines: 
24. Q. You did not talk to Mr. Echols personally? 
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25. A. No, I did not. 
8. Q. Did you talk to him after that time? 
9. A. No I never actually talked to him. He would 
10. send me letters . . . but I don't recall him 
11. coming in. 
12. Q. Personally? Or by phone? 
13. A. No. No. 
"As a matter of general evidence law, a deposition is 
generally a more reliable means of ascertaining the truth 
than an affidavit, since a deponent is subject to cross-
examination and an affiant is not • • • The rule that a 
party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that 
contradicts his deposition to create an issue of fact on 
a motion for summary judgment does not apply when there is 
some substantial likelihood that the deposition testimony 
was in error for reasons that appear in the deposition or 
the party-deponent is able to state in his affidavit an 
adequate explanation for the contradictory answer in his 
deposition." 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Utah 1983). 
Applying these rules to the case at bar the affiant, Ms. Audrey 
Hooper, asserts knowledge to the Appellant, which did not exist, (R 
at 70 par. No. 4). Therefore, the Attorney's prepared and canned 
Affidavit, notarized by himself, a beneficiary to the fraud, (App-
5 and 5A) was submitted and filed with the Trial Court instead of the 
Deposition of the same day; since the scheduled Deposition dated 
April 29, 1989, (R at 55) and (R at 54) did not come out the way he 
envisioned, or expected it to be (R at 50) and (R at 46 P.2 par. 3). 
This is a clear and precise act of fraud against the Appellant, See 
7 Am Jur 2d Attorneys at Law, U 43 "for knowingly allowing a witness 
to give perjured testimony without informing the court of the fact." 
A case in point which should apply to the case at bar states: 
"An attorney is never justified in continuing a case after 
he has knowledge of the fact that it is being supported by 
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perjured testimony; and if he proceeds with the trial 
thereafter, without acquainting the court of the fact that 
the testimony is false and seeks to recover judgment on 
such testimony, his misconduct merits disbarment." 
In RE King, 322 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1958). 
Furthermore, the Affidavit makes no explanation for the 
inconsistencies declared in the Deposition at the same time, by the 
same person, on the same day, whereby the Respondent complains of a 
"mistake,11 which does not exist, (R at 70 par. No.4). Therefore, 
the Deposition is a more accurate means of truth, and the Attorney's 
prepared and canned Affidavit notarized by himself, a beneficiary to 
the fraud, renders no value or support to this case, only the 
absolute proof of fraud by the Respondent, against the Appellant. 
There you have it, the Respondent's manufactured fraud, the prepared 
and canned Affidavit dated April 29, 1989, (App-5 and 5A) with its 
supporting canned and manufactured letter uncertified without a 
return receipt, undated, purporting to render knowledge to the 
Appellant (R at 56) for the purpose of alleging mistake to accomplish 
wrongful eviction, wrongful attachment, and wrongful possession of 
the Appellant's, his spouse's and his children's property in direct 
retaliation, directly resulting from the Appellant's letters (App-3, 
8, 9, 10, and 13). Further discussion on letters and knowledge can 
be reviewed on (R at 50), Deposition pages 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36, 
which clearly shows that the Appellant was not under any duty for 
lack of knowledge purported by the Respondent's asserted claim of 
"mistake." Furthermore, the Respondent proclaims (R at 46 p. No. 1, 
par. No. 3) referring to the Appellant's objection (R at 50 par. 13), 
"said objection contains examples of immaterial issues,N whereby the 
Respondent confirms for lack of proper objection that $40 per month 
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for both units was appropriately reduced by the duly authorized agent 
with apparent authority, and no alleged mistake exists. Therefore, 
reformation must not be granted, during the review process in 
affirming the Trial Court's Summary Judgment, which was granted in 
violation of the contractual notification requirements. Finally, 
the third is the intention grounds elaborated in length by the 
Respondent in his brief which does not apply in this case, under the 
exception as italicized. 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts^* £ 135, 
144 pages 486-487, and 499, states the doctrine as follows: 
"Where a party enters into a contract ignorant of a fact 
but meaning to waive all inquiry into it, or waives an 
investigation after attention has been called to it, there 
is no mistake in the legal sense. Moreover, mere ignorance 
of the facts is not necessarily a ground for relief, nor 
will the courts relieve one from the consequences of his 
own improvidence or poor judgment. Parties must exercise 
ordinary diligence in the execution of contracts and are 
chargeable with such knowledge as diligence would have 
disclosed and may not avoid a contract [Notification 
Requirements for rent-rate increases] on the basis of 
mistake where it appears that ignorance of the facts was 
the result of carelessness, indifference, or inattention." 
Moreno Mut. IRR. Co. v. Beaumont IRR. Dist., 211 P.2d 937, 938 (Cal 
1949). Applying this rule to the case at bar the Appellant's 
documents (App-3, 8, 9, and 10) without any response, "just put the 
copies into the file," (App-6A lines 20 and 21) and the Appellant's 
responses (App-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27) without 
any response renders the Respondent's asserted claim of "Mistake" to 
no mistake in the legal sense. Therefore, no reformation is entitled 
and, of course, no alleged default exists for the period of time May 
1988 through September 10, 1988, during this period of time the 
Appellant's rent-paid storage units were locked up. Consequently, 
appropriate damages are now clearly visible, as a matter of law, for 
trover and conversion of the Appellant's business property; hence, 
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the proper entitlement of damages for the Appellant from the 
Respondent, pursuant to the Appellant's properly filed counterclaim 
(R at 69). Furthermore, no purported default exists for the period 
of time October 1988 through July 1989, as claimed by the Respondent, 
directly resulting from the appropriate Appellant's lien that was 
timely and appropriately amortized to off-set the current legal rents 
at the properly notified amount. 
Other noted authorities not in conflict with any of the cited 
authorities on this issue of mistake as previously discussed and 
cited above are as cited below. 
McMahon v. Tanner, 249 P.2d 506 (Utah 1952). 
Sine v. Harper, 222 P.2d 580, 581 (Utah 1950). 
Hence there is no mistake in the legal sense, and the 
Respondent's asserted claim of contractual and statutory 
justification for locking the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit 
facilities is an act of fraud that was relied upon by the Trial Court 
in granting the Summary Judgment against the Appellant for which 
great damage has been suffered, is being suffered and may continue 
to be suffered by the Appellant if action is not taken immediately, 
in the Appellant's behalf. 
In Summary, the Respondent as of July 1989 was only entitled to 
$400 in cash that amount had already been subtracted from the amount 
of cash owing to the Appellant where he was to receive $5,830.50, see 
(App-27). Consequently, the asserted fraudulent claims by the 
Respondent, in selling all of the Appellant's remaining property, 
personal records, spouse's and children's property whereby 
replacement value is near $100,000 for the purported sum of $2,300 
is an act of fraud, for which they must be held accountable! Will 
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this Court do that? 
ISSUE II 
THE REMEDIES TAKEN BY AND AFFORDED TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE 
ALLEGED DEPENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY THE PULL AMOUNT OF RENT WERE NOT 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
The Respondent has brought to the forefront the Utah Code 
Section 38-8-3 claiming protection on the asserted premise that there 
is an established default by the Appellant reiterated many times 
throughout their proclamated claim and Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R at 56 par. 16, 23, and 30) which specifically describes landlord's 
statutory duties of responsibility that must be followed prior to any 
enforcement action against the tenant, which is specifically 
described in Utah Code section 38-8-2: 
••Before taking enforcement action under Section 38-8-3, 
the owner shall determine if a financing statement filed 
in accordance with Section 70A-9-401, et seq. has been 
filed with the Division of Corporation and Commercial Code 
concerning the property to be sold or otherwise disposed 
of." 
No place in the record is there any compliance with this 
statutory duty of responsibility by the landlord as asserted by the 
affiant Mr. Steven J. Nelson Affidavit par. 6 (App-14A) and notarized 
by his Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud, for the period of time 
May 1988 through September 10, 1988, during the first period of the 
Appellant's lock-up or any other period of time prior to commencement 
of the lawsuit by the landlord, January 20, 1989. 
Utah Code Section 38-8-3(2) states: 
"After the occupant has been in default continuously for 
a period of 30 days, the owner may begin enforcement action 
if the occupant has been given notice in writing. The 
notice shall be delivered in person or sent by certified 
mail to the last known address of the occupant, and a copy 
of the notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the 
sheriff of the county where the self-service storage 
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facility is located." 
No place in the record is there any compliance with this 
statutory duty of responsibility by the landlord as asserted by the 
affiant, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, Affidavit par. 6 (App-14A) and 
notarized by his Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud; further 
asserted by the affiant, Ms. Audrey Hooper (App-5 and 5A) and 
notarized by her Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud; for the period 
of time May 1988 through September 10, 1988, during the first period 
of the Appellant's lock-up, or any other period of time prior to the 
commencement of the lawsuit by the landlord, January 20,1989. 
The Utah Code Section 38-8-3(3) states: 
HThis notice shall include: 
(a) An itemized statement of the owner's claim showing 
the sum due at the time of the notice and the date when 
the sum became due; 
(b) A brief and general description of the personal 
property subject to the lien, which description shall be 
reasonably adequate to permit the person notified to 
identify the property; except that any container including, 
but not limited to, a trunk, valise, or box that is locked, 
fastened, sealed, or tied in a manner which deters 
immediate access to its contents may be described as such 
without describing its contents; 
(c) A notification of denial of access to the personal 
property, if such denial is permitted under the terms of 
the rental agreement, which notification shall provide the 
name, street, address, and telephone number of the owner 
or his designated agent whom the occupant may contact to 
respond to the notification; 
(d) A demand for payment within a specified time not less 
than 15 days after delivery of the notice; and 
(e) A conspicuous statement that, unless the claim is paid 
within the time stated in the notice, the personal property 
will be advertised for sale or other disposition and will 
be sold or otherwise disposed of at the specified time and 
place•" 
No place in the record is there any compliance with this 
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statutory duty of responsibility by the landlord as asserted by the 
affiant, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, Affidavit par. 6 (App-14A) and 
notarized by his Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud for the period 
of time May 1988 through September 10, 1988, during the first period 
of the Appellant's lock-up or any other period of time prior to 
commencement of the lawsuit by the landlord, January 20, 1989. 
The law in Utah is well established on issues of fact asserted 
by affiants in their Affidavits utilized to support Summary Judgments 
as previously cited and pointed out above by the Respondent's 
affiant, Mr. Steven J. Nelson's wild-eyed, bald assertion par. 6 
(App-14A), and notarized by his Attorney, a beneficiary to the fraud. 
"The mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without 
a proper evidentiary foundation to support that assertion 
is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary 
judgment motion." 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1983). 
Consequently, the false and fraudulent asserted claims, by this 
affiant, Mr. Steven J. Nelson, and his subordinate counterpart, Ms. 
Audrey Hooper, are a mere pretext for the utilization and the 
application of the law in their favor, for which enforcement action 
entitlement is not available, since the Respondent did not follow the 
appropriate statutory prerequisites to enforcement, required as 
statutory duties of responsibility, but took the law into their own 
hands persistently, violating the tenant's rights, to undisturbed 
access, the landlord's implied covenant. 
The only possible claim that may be construed to be in some 
compliance would be (App-8A and 8B) attached to (App-8) and (App-7, 
for June 1988) which was recognized, received and accepted at the 
properly notified rent-rate of $55 per month for both units, thereby 
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waiving any rights to claim default. The case at bar, should apply 
the law, as stated in Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain, 
560 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1977). 
"Where by reason of a breach of a condition, a lease 
becomes [in default], the lessor is entitled to recover 
possession. He waives that right by the acceptance of 
rent. He cannot accept the rent, and at the same time 
claim a [default] of the lease.H 
The rate of rent was clearly established in May 1988 (App-4 and 
4A) and then confirmed in June 1988 (App-7 and 8) by the acceptance 
of the appropriate amount of rent, per the terms and conditions of 
the Rental Agreement. 
The Appellant fails to comprehend the logical reasoning, i.e. 
the Appellant's failure to pay the full amount of rent; 
therefore, all his remaining assets, his spouse's assets, 
and his children's assets are to be seized and sold for 
the enforcement of the local verbal telephone "Cartel" then 
the Appellant is to be placed in jail until they get more! 
on the asserted premise of default, or any authority of any kind in 
asserting as claimed by the Respondent that they had a contractual 
and statutory right to deny access to the Appellant's rent-paid 
storage units beginning in May 1988 through September 10, 1988, in 
direct violation of the landlord's implied covenant to undisturbed 
access when accepting the full rental payments per the Rental 
Agreement. This is an unconscionable claim by the Respondent, which 
must not be affirmed. 
The Appellant was wrongfully subjected to economic duress, 
intimidation, extortion, self-help remedies to the Appellant's 
property as asserted in the properly filed counterclaim (R at 69) by 
the Respondent, in direct violation of the Utah Judicial Code 78-
36-2(1) Forcible Detainer (App-31A) which states: 
"Every person is guilty of forcible detainer who by force, 
or by menaces and threats of violencey unlawfully holds and 
keeps the possession of any real property whether the same 
was acquired peaceably or otherwise." 
A similar case in point which should apply to the case at bar 
states: 
HThere is no question under Dtah cases that a violation of 
the duty set by the statutes gives rise to an action for 
damages, not in an action under the Forcible Entry and 
Detainer Statutes but as a separate tort." 
King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1955). Consequently, the 
Appellant's properly filed counterclaim for trover and conversion, 
the establishment of the Appellant's lien, should not be dismissed 
with prejudice (R at 69). Since there was no mistake in the legal 
sense, nor is there any default as asserted by the Respondent's in 
locking the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors, for the period 
of time May 1988 through September 10, 1988, nor is there any default 
for the period of time October 1988 through July 1989 resulting from 
the Appellant's appropriate counterclaim—Appellant's lien 
amortizations. Therefore, the self-help remedies taken by and 
afforded to the Plaintiff for the alleged Defendant's failure to pay 
the full amount of rent were not in accordance with law, and must not 
be affirmed in the Respondent's adamant request for Summary Judgment 
affirmance. 
ISSUE III 
THIS CODRT DOES HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE POSTJUDGMENT 
ACTIONS OP THE TRIAL COURT, AND THE ACTIONS FOLLOWED WERE NOT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
The Respondent asserts and cites the Utah Court of Appeals order 
dated November 1, 1989 which states: 
"Furthermore, proceedings occurring subsequent to the final 
order being appealed are outside the scope of the issues 
on appeal, a defect which cannot be cured by amendment of 
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the docketing statement filed in this appeal.11 
The Respondent further asserts and complains that this court 
does not have jurisdiction citing Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641, P.2d 142 
(Utah 1982) which states: 
"The final judgment rules does not preclude review of 
post judgment orders. Such orders are independently subject 
to the test of finality, according to their own substance 
and effect." 
This case does not limit any jurisdiction of this court for the 
review of postjudgment actions taken by the Respondent for the 
unlawful collection of $400 in cash, commingled with several blatant 
violations of U.S. and State of Utah Constitutional and statutory 
rights, maliciously ignored by the Respondent and the Trial Court in 
the professed lawful required enforcement action. 
Next, the Respondent asserts the case State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 
521 (Utah App. 1989) declaring summary dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction is appropriate. 
In reply to each of the Respondent's asserted arguments, self 
serving claims, to thwart accountability, the Appellant respectfully 
states: the Notice of Appeal dated July 20, 1989, the motion for 
Extraordinary Writ, case No. 890455 dated July 21, 1989, the notice 
of property bond dated July 21, 1989, all served prior to the sale 
of the Appellant's, his spouse's and his children's property (App-
1) and (App-40) the Utah Court of Appeals Order dated July 25, 1989, 
conveyed by telephone just minutes before the scheduled sale and 
execution on July 25, 1989, during which time the Appellant was under 
severe emotional distress states: 
"The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. 
Petitioner William L. Echols has an adequate and sufficient 
remedy for any alleged error by way of an appeal and 
posting a supersedeas bond.11 
I guess for someone with a lot of money this may be OK, but what 
about the impoverished, impecunious, Pro-Se litigant, with his 
remaining life's possessions, who has had his business property 
unlawfully locked up for in excess of five (5) months, and the vital 
spare parts and repair manual inside unaccounted for, no property 
accounting if still there after the self-help remedies taken during 
the Appellant's published absence. Who cares? What is a 
counterclaim? Do tenant's have any rights? What is the purpose of 
White v. District Court of Utah County? 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Order dated August 1, 1989, 
referring to the Appellant's motion to "Amend Appellant's 
Counterclaim" states: 
"Said motion is hereby denied and all issues are reserved 
for plenary consideration of the appeal." 
OK, the court wants to look at the whole picture before they make a 
final judgment. The Appellant can go along with that, so let's do 
it; look at the whole case including the Appellant's Amended Record 
on Appeal. 
The Respondent proclaims in his response (dated July 27, 1989), 
to the Appellant's motions utilized in the order cited above, i.e., 
August 1, 1989, "respondent requests notice thereof so that an 
appropriate response may be filed addressing the issues raised." OK, 
give the Respondent a voice in the decision process. 
The Appellant's motion to the Utah Court of Appeals Objection 
to Motion to Enforce Order Re: Bond and to Dismiss dated November 9, 
1989, is self explanatory, mentioning Exempt Property 1 
The Respondent proclaims in response, opposition to Appellant's 
Motion for Property Accounting and to Amend Docketing Statement and 
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Request for Relief dated November 17, 1989, stating: 
"If for any [reason] the Court should deem any 
reconsideration appropriate, American respectfully requests 
the opportunity to address the merits more fully." 
whatever the Respondent wanted to say to correct, if necessary, the 
Appellant's amended correct record on Appeal, it was availed to him 
and properly served pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals Rule No. 
11(h) dated November 20, 1989, and properly included in the 
Appellant's Brief file dated December 19, 1989. 
The Appellant properly filed in a timely manner November 21, 
1989, his objection to the Respondent's Response Amended Docketing 
Statement and Request for Relief dated November 17, 1989. 
The Utah Court of Appeals immediately filed November 23, 1989, 
received November 28, 1989, the Appellant's briefing schedule, 
without ruling on each of the following: 
(A) Respondent's Motion to Enforce Order Re: Bond 
dated November 3, 1989. 
(B) Appellant's Objection to Motion to Enforce Order 
Re: Bond dated November 9, 1989. 
(C) Appellant's Objection to Respondent's Response 
Amended Docketing Statement and Request for Relief, 
dated November 21, 1989. 
Consequently, the Appellant included in his Brief filed December 19, 
1989, the entire case, including the Appellant's amended correct 
record on Appeal; a U.S. Federal Court required prerequisite of U.S. 
Constitutional questions in state appellate court, prior to Federal 
Review, a case in point states that: 
"According to Daye, Supra, at 196, if a defendant cites to 
cases which concern one's constitutional right to a fair 
trial, the state court is on notice of the defendant's 
constitutional claims." 
Nelson v. Jones, 573 F. Supp. 1138 (U.S.D.C.S.D. New York 1983). 
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This Court is hereby duly noticed as stated in the Appellant's 
Amended Docketing Statement dated November 16, 1989f the appropriate 
and correct record on appeal pursuant to Utah Court of Appeals Rule 
No. 11(h) file dated November 20# 1989/ as to violations against the 
Appellant's Constitutional Rights including but not limited to 
unlawful incarceration discussed in the Appellant's Brief and the 
appropriate Appellant's Amended Docketing Statement as described. 
Moreover, the Respondent as requested utilized his ability to object 
or respond in any way he saw appropriate in correcting the 
Appellant's record on appeal and controverting the Appellant's valid 
claims. Now he has done so! 
The Appellant now applies the "Writ of Coram Nobis" to this 
Court in bringing the matters described in the Appellant's Amended 
Docketing Statement dated November 16, 1989f and the Appellant's 
unchallenged correct record on appeal dated November 20 , 1989, in 
proper compliance with any jurisdictional questions raised by the 
Respondent/ in his self serving objections to thwart any 
accountability for violations of the Appellant/ his spouse's and his 
children's U.S. and State of Utah Constitutional rights/ clearly 
violated in his malicious attempt too cover up his fraud and deceit 
utilized in obtaining the Summary Judgment and the inappropriate/ 
unlawful enforcement actions against the Appellant/ for which 
accountability must be made. An appropriate case in point which 
should apply to the case at bar states: 
"The effort to upset this conviction in this manner must 
be considered in connection with our rules of procedure. 
When an accused is convicted of a crime, our law requires 
that any claimed error or defect be corrected by a regular 
appeal within the time allowed by law, and if this is not 
done the judgment becomes final . . • [Exception clause 
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which should apply] only when the interests of justice so 
demand because of some extraordinary circumstance or 
exigency: e.g. lack of jurisdiction, mistaken identity, 
where the requirement of law have been so ignored or 
distorted that the accused has been deprived of 'due 
process of law1 or there is shown to exist some other such 
circumstance that it would be unconscionable not to review 
the conviction.11 
Sullivan v, Turner, 448 P.2d 908, 909 (Utah 1968). 
Furthermore, the Appellant, a Utah County "jail bird" at the 
demand of the Respondent, and the malicious retaliatory endorsement 
of the Trial Court during the properly noticed Oral Arguments hereby 
invokes his rights post-conviction remedies and procedural 
considerations for this Utah Court of Appeal's review of the 
Appellant's Amended Appeal set forth correctly, properly and in a 
timely manner nearly sixty (60) days before the Respondent was 
required to file his Brief, and states according to William v. 
Kullman, 722 P.2d 1048 (2d Cir.l 1983) and located in Rights of 
Prisoners, Gobert and Cohen ^3.00 (1989), which states: 
H[Appellate] courts should not summarily dismiss prisoner 
petitions containing sufficient allegations of 
constitutional violations .. . Moreover, due to the pro-
se petitionees general lack of expertise, courts should 
review [Coram Nobis] petitions with a lenient eye, allowing 
borderline cases to proceed . . . If the writ of [Coram 
Nobis] is to continue to have meaningful purpose, it must 
be accessible not only to those with a strong legal 
background or financial means to retain counsel, but also 
to the mass of uneducated, unrepresented prisoners." 
Therefore, this court is not in want of jurisdiction as asserted 
by the Respondent when utilizing the above entitled case law and the 
Constitution of Utah Art I Sec. 11, that clearly declares: 
WA11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any 
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civil cause to which he is a party." 
Hence, the jurisdictional question of this Court must be resolved in 
favor of the Appellant, and in favor of the Appellant's Amended 
correct Record on Appeal, for which the Respondent's objections have 
been duly noted, without merit or force, of any kind, since nothing 
is controverted on the Appellant's correct Record on Appeal, which 
was properly filed and served on November 20, 1989. The Appellant 
objects to the Respondent's wild-eyed, bald assertions, i.e., of the 
properly noticed supplemental proceedings, and he did not answer the 
questions over the phone as stated, "At that time he stated he did 
not own these items any more and did not know where they were." 
The second portion of the question . . . "if so, were such 
actions in accordance with law? 
The Respondent asserts, "The Execution and Writ of Restitution 
could be and were issued immediately." Thus giving the Respondent 
the alleged right, during the Appellant's published absence in 
violation of the Appellant's, his spouse's and his children's rights, 
Utah Judicial Code 78-36-2(2) (App-31A), 78-36-9 (App-33) to break 
into the Appellant's appropriate and timely paid amortization rent-
paid storage unit facilities, in violation of the Constitution of the 
United States 4th Amendment (App-32) declaring that the Appellant, 
his spouse, and his children have no Constitutional rights, or 
property protection rights even if the unauthorized clerk-signed 
court order was valid against the Appellant, whereby rummaging and 
pilfering occurred under the court-ordered guise of justice with no 
accountability, which should be required by some court of this land. 
Who cares? Let us move to Russia, or Nazi Germany where the courts 
and the police do as they please, to hell with the rights of the 
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citizens! Who protects citizen rights in Utah anyway? The Appellant 
has not seen all of his property since June 19, 1989! 
The Respondent further asserts, "the Defendant could not have 
lawfully removed any of the property, so he was not damaged by any 
failure to remove those locks." When was the last time that cut 
locks did not constitute damage, or the forcible detainer to exempt 
property occur as damages, since the Appellant's locks cannot be 
reused after being cut with bolt cutters, nor can the Appellant's 
exempt business property (spare parts and repair manual) be used to 
operate his business when locked up and now sold? Furthermore, 
proper accounting of property could have been made, properly removing 
the specific family property clearly identified by names on each box, 
e.g., Saneh's, Willie's, Micah's, Courtney's, and Bill's and 
appropriate Exempt Property allowances if that was their intention. 
No there was no intention of any kind to allow this family any 
property protection rights (Exempt Property) plunder and rob with the 
court and the police protection. That is what it is all about, in 
this Sovereign State of Utah. Protect our local businesses so they 
will invest in Utah, but plunder the citizens who make them go, 
especially those who have moved in from out of state with their 
family household goods stored in them. Give them the welcome that 
they deserve; show them who's boss! To hell with the tenant 
protection laws. 
The Judge corrected his alleged error, after communications with 
the opposing council, and the officiating sheriff's office, a 
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, see 7 Am Jur 
2d Attorneys at Law, § 42, "Violation of this prohibition or of a 
similar bar rule, has been held to warrant disciplinary action." 
Will Utah enforce or perform disciplinary action? 
The Respondent asserts without any real- property accounting 
clearly marked on each specific box noted as (full or empty) on the 
purported sale (AR at 2B and 7), HAs to property not belonging to 
him, that would not seem to be a defense • . . cannot be circumvented 
merely by having someone other than the owner contract for the 
storage.M 
The law in Utah is well settled on that issue of exempt 
propertyf which if observed by the Respondent would have yielded an 
appropriate inquiry, interrogatory, or some attempted compliance with 
the laws of this Sovereign State of Utah (App-38 and 39). For 
example, (App-3) household goods and (AR at 2B and 7) which states: 
"Two couches included an early American couch and a white couch . . 
• assorted dressers, one with a mirror. The hutch was a china hutch, 
a nine-piece dinette set—[solid cherry valued to nearly $6,000]— 
assorted boxes"—which included 2 sets of china and a tea set. One 
set of china was a twelve place-setting with extra platters, serving 
dishes, pitcher—Noritake, valued to nearly $2,000—crystal, 
silverware, and many, many other items not listed on the professed 
sale sheet, perhaps stolen before the sale, during the Appellant's 
published absence so as not to be discovered by the Appellant. 
Obviously, these are women's items, which should be protected by the 
Constitution of Utah (App-39). They were not! If the Appellant had 
a house, wouldn't these items be appropriate in a house instead of 
storage? Poor invalid Respondent logic! 
There was no circumvention intended. It is a fact of life that 
household goods include all members of the household, not just the 
contracting, unemployed, impoverished father. Each member has items 
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they planned for; each struggling through honest hard work# paying 
with cash to acquire for their benefit and use, at their own 
discretion of time, not at the whims of Mr. Steven J. Nelson who 
arrogantly decides when and who can have access to their property 
when he determines and asserts that someone is in default. Thus, 
locking the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors without the 
proper statutory enforcement procedures, attempting to extort more 
cash or lose their property. For example, tenants do not need to 
fear or make those kinds of decisions month after month at the whines 
and whims of the landlord. They must have undisturbed access to come 
and go as they please without the interference, whimsical policies, 
and befuddled actions of the landlord under the complained of guise, 
i.e., mistakes yielding a defense whereby the local, verbal telephone 
wCartelH for the establishment of rent rates can be implemented with 
court-ordered approval and immediate enforcement in stripping 
families of their life-long possessions earned and paid for with cash 
from honest hard work. Will this Court protect this family? Do 
individuals have rights in Utah? 
The Respondent asserts: 
Notwithstanding the Appellant's notice of appeal, the 
Appelllant's signed warning, property bond (App-1 and 40) 
the personal service of a copy of the Extraordinary Writ 
Case No. 890455, relied upon by the Appellant in trying to 
protect against the Respondent's asserted claims against 
his family's household property until a trial or some sort 
of resolution to the untried, adjudged, decreed-Summary-
Judgment claims of the Respondent could be effectively 
challenged. 
NNot only does the delay in claiming an exemption bar defendant 
from claiming error, but it indicates that in all likelihood, nothing 
was sold that was exempt." This is preposterous. The Appellant 
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claims error, lack of knowledge, extreme emotional distress, and if 
known at the time, would have prevented the judgment sale. 
Consequently, this allows the appropriate legal remedy which is now 
available that must apply, i.e., the Writ of Coram Nobis. 
MThe purpose of the writ of coram nobis is to bring before 
the court rendering the judgment matters of fact which, if 
known at the time the judgment was rendered, would 
presumably have prevented its rendition." 
American Law Reports, Annotated, 58 ALR 1286. 
The law in Utah has established: 
11
 It is essential to the availability of the remedy of coram 
nobis . • . that the mistake of fact relied upon for relief 
was unknown to the applicant at the time of the trial, and 
could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have been 
discovered by him in time to have been presented to the 
court, unless he was prevented from so doing by duress, 
fear, or other sufficient cause, so that it was by no 
negligence or other fault of his that the matter was not 
made to appear at the former trial." 
State v. Woodard, 160 P.2d 433 (Utah 1945). Applying this rule to 
the case at bar the Appellant utilized all his diligent means, 
notwithstanding his lack of knowledge, the emotional distress 
resulting from breaking and entering into his property during his 
published absence, also the Respondent's adamant trespassing claims 
upon the Appellant's return July 11, 1989, without any real property 
accounting exempt or otherwise (R at 31). The numerous, ignored 
motions written day after day well documented and noted by the 
Respondent's shopping list of citations, and of course, the timely 
appeal with the appropriate written and signed warnings, should 
render to the Appellant the appropriate right and valid claim of 
"Coram Nobis", in demanding appropriate Exempt Property claims 
against the Respondent's subterfuge of self serving excuses utilized 
to unlawfully strip this man and his family of their life-time 
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accumulated possessions, paid for with cash for the only lawful claim 
of $400 in cash. The Respondent is clearly liable to the Appellant 
as properly noticed (App-1) and full property restitution is 
required, plus the other damages caused by their unlawful fraudulent 
acts. Hence, the Respondent's actions were not in accordance with 
law, and their violent disrespect and breach of the law cannot be 
justified by any known means. Furthermore, examples should be made 
of the Respondents in order to send a clear message to all of the 
self storage facilities in the State of Utah, who rely upon similar 
tactics ensuring that this State of Utah will not tolerate to any 
degree the fraudulent, disrespectful practices now employed in the 
local, verbal telephone "Cartel" for rent-rates, and tenant lock-up 
procedures, utilized to enforce whimsical policies, self-help 
procedures, alleged mistakes, or whatever against the individual 
tenants, who rely upon implied covenants, written contracts, payment 
notices, for the performance of their duties, obligations and 
responsibilities. What manner of Judges and men are ye that would 
sit on your hands and ignore the Appellant's Amended correct record 
on Appeal for the unlawful collection of $400 in cash. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent's failure to appropriately object or controvert 
with any facts or case law the Appellant's numbered issues one 
through twelve renders irrefutable valid claims by the Appellant 
against the Respondent for which great damage has been suffered, is 
being suffered, and may continue to be suffered if full redress is 
not available to the Appellant immediately. Consequently, the 
Appellant's counterclaim, and the appropriate authority to amend, 
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must be granted along with the Respondent's requirement to pay 
advanced attorney fees whereby the Appellant can obtain legal counsel 
for the appropriate legal prosecution of the wrongful tortious acts 
taken by the Respondent unlawfully against the Appellant. The 
Appellant affirmatively moves this Court for summary disposition of 
these matters in favor of the Appellant immediately! 
The Appellant has appropriately controverted the Respondent's 
numbered issues one through three whereby the Respondent's adamantly 
requested Summary Judgment Affirmance must not be rendered by this 
Court. This Court's responsible actions would include but not 
limited to sending an order to the American Fork Circuit Trial Court 
of Utah County reversing the unenforceable claims of the Respondent, 
directing further appropriate Appellant claims to the District Court 
of Utah County for the Appellant's immediate prosecution and 
enforcement of his counterclaim and amended counterclaim, and with 
all costs to be paid by the Respondent, including but not limited to 
full property restitution immediately; disciplinary actions against 
the judges, sheriffs, court clerks and the moving Attorney would also 
be appropriate at this time. 
Respectfully submitted 
William L. Echols, Pro-Se 
Defendant and Appellant 
733 North 800 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(801) 377-0705 
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Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing 
Appellant's Reply Brief was mailed to Lynn P. Heward #1479f Attorney 
for the Plaintiff and Respondent, 923 East 5375 South #E, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84117 on this /Jx£ day of 
VihAviaM / 1990, with full postage attached thereon. The 
sum of three copies, as agreed. 
William L. Echols, Pro-Se 
Defendant and Appellant 
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F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS JUL£5lr*^ 
ooOoo # ^ < ^ 
'\t?j** of lh« Court * 
William L. Echols, ) iwbCQuiitfAppeaii 
Petitioner, ) ORDER DENYING 
) EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
v* ) 
) Case No. 890455-CA 
Fourth Circuit Court, State of ) 
Utah, Utah County, American ) 
Fork Department, ) 
Respondents. 
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. 
Petitionor William L. Echols has an adequate and sufficient 
remedy for any alleged error by way of an appeal and posting a 
supercedeas bond. See R. Utah Ct. App. 3; Utah R. Civ. P. 
62(d). 
Furthermore, petitioner does not request any specific form 
of relief, or show that he will suffer irreparable harm absent 
such relief and the judgment creditor will not be prejudiced. 
Petitioner has also failed to adequately inform this Court as 
to the nature of the judgment entered by the trial court or its 
ruling which petitioner challenges. 
The petition is denied. 
DATED this IS— day of July, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
F ILED 
American Fork Investors, a 
California imited partnership, 
dba American Self Storage, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
William L. Echols, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTIONS 
Case No* 890461-CA 
Appellant's motions for -directed verdict," "new trial" and 
to "amend appellant's counterclaim" are considered by this 
court to be, in substance, a motion for summary reversal under 
R. Utah Ct. App. 10. Said motion is hereby denied and all 
issues are reserved for plenary consideration of the appeal. 
DATED this / ^ d ; day of August, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Norman H. Jaclraon, Judge 
